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Abstract
In distribution problems, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the
Proportional (P ) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most
popular ways to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, when using the egalitarian
division, agents may receive more than her claim. We propose a compromise
between the proportional and the egalitarian solutions by considering the
restriction that no one receives more than her claim. We show that the most
egalitarian compromise fulfilling this restriction ensures a minimum amount
to each agent, and it can be interpreted as a process that works in two
steps as follows: first, all agents receive an equal share up to the smallest
claim (egalitarian distribution), and then the remaining estate (if any) is
allocated proportionally to the remaining claims (proportional solution).
Finally, we obtain that the recursive application of this process finishes at
the Constrained Equal Awards solution (CEA).
Keywords: Claims problems, Proportional solution, Equal Awards,
Compromise, Lorenz dominance
JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
1. Introduction.
A claims problem is a particular case of distribution problems, in which
the amount to be distributed, the estate E, is not enough to cover the agents’
claims on it. This model describes the situation faced by a court that has to
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distribute the net worth of a bankrupt firm among its creditors, but it also
corresponds with cost-sharing, taxation, or rationing problems. How should
the scarce resources be allocated among its claimants? The formal anal-
ysis of situations like these, which originates in a seminal paper by O’Neill
(1982), shows that a vast number of well-behaved solutions have been defined
for solving claims problems, being the Proportional and the Equal Awards
(egalitarian) the two prominent concepts used in real world.1 The term well-
behaved reflects the idea that the considered solutions might fulfill some
principles of fairness, or appealing properties. Furthermore, an equity prin-
ciple that has been used to compare solutions is that of Lorenz-dominance
(see Dutta and Ray (1989)). A recent paper (Bosmans and Lauwers (2011))
compares the most usual bankruptcy rules in terms of Lorenz-dominance and
analyzes those solutions that favour to smaller claimants relative to larger
ones.
Although the Proportional division is the most used, whenever the small-
est claim is very small compared with the largest one, a proportional division
provides nearly nothing for this (these) small claimant(s).2
An illustrative example of claims problems is the fishing quotas reduc-
tion, in which the agent’s claim can be understood as the previous captures,
and the estate is the new (lower) level of joint captures. A similar example
is given by milk quotas among the EU members.3 In both examples, pro-
portionality is the main principle used. Nevertheless, a minimal (survival)
amount, guaranteed to each producer, should be fixed in order to ensure the
profitability of fishing (milk) industries. That is, some part of the estate
should be allocated in an egalitarian way. This idea is somewhat related to
the axiom of Sustainability (see Herrero and Villar (2002)). As they mention,
“Sustainability is a protective criterion for those agents with
small claims. To illustrate this, consider the interpretation of
a bankruptcy situation as a reduction in the fishing quotas. Here
agent i’s claim corresponds to her actual level of captures and
1The reader is referred to the survey by Thomson (2003).
2“In western society, for example, the customary solution would be to split the asset
in proportion topg. the claims”, see Young (1994), pg. 123.
3Quotas were introduced in 1984. Each member state was given a reference quantity
which was then allocated to individual producers. The initial quotas were not sufficiently
restrictive as to remedy the surplus situation and so the quotas were cut in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Quotas will end on April 1, 2015.
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the estate to be distributed to the new aggregate level of cap-
tures. Sustainable claims correspond to those levels of captures
such that, if nobody else had a larger level, the aggregate new
level of captures would not impose any rationing. Sustainability
says that agents with sustainable claims should not be rationed
after the change in the aggregate level of captures.”
A similar situation can be found when a university distributes the budget
to Departments. In this case, the resources are distributed proportionally
to the number of Professors, students, subjects, etc., but a minimal (fixed)
amount is allocated to each regardless of size.
An alternative example of using the proportional approach is the way in
which seats in the Spanish Parliament are allocated to each of the electoral
districts (provinces).4 This is made proportionally to the population in each
province, but a minimal number of seats (2) is guaranteed to each.5 A similar
situation is found in the US case: based on data from the decennial census,
each state is allocated a proportion of the 435 seats in the United States
House of Representatives, although each state is guaranteed a minimum of
one seat, regardless of population.6 The remaining seats are allocated one at
a time, to the state with the highest priority number. This apportionment is
based on the proportion of each state’s population to that of the Fifty States
together. We shall return to these examples later.
The previous comments and examples show that real world, when apply-
ing proportional distributions, try to ensure an egalitarian (minimal) amount
4This example involves indivisibilities, which is not a trivial issue (see, for instance,
Herrero and Mart´ınez (2004)).
5In the case of Spanish Parliament, the allocation mechanism is as follows (Spanish
LOREG, 2011, art. 162): [1.] Congress is composed of three hundred and fifty Deputies.
[2.] Each province has a corresponding initial minimum of two deputies. [3.] The remain-
ing two hundred and forty-eight deputies are distributed among the provinces in proportion
to its population, according to the following procedure: a) Obtain a distribution fee ob-
tained by dividing by two hundred forty-eight the total number of the legal population of
peninsular and island provinces. b) Allocate to each province as many deputies as result-
ing, in whole numbers, dividing the population of provincial law by the quota allocation.
c) The remaining deputies are distributed by assigning one to each of the provinces whose
quotient obtained under paragraph before, have a higher decimal fraction.
6“Each State shall have at Least one Representative” (U.S. Const., art. I, 2, cl. 3.).
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to each agent. In this paper we will define a new solution concept that
captures this behavior. This solution can be understood as a compromise
between the proportional and the egalitarian division. Noting that the first
(proportional) distribution is a widely used solution for claims problems, and
that the second distribution (equal awards, which is not a solution since an
agent may receive an award larger than her claim) is the most egalitarian
distribution available, we search for a compromise between them. In choos-
ing this compromise, if for each problem we wanted to use the same weight
on the proportional and the egalitarian distributions, the largest weight one
could assign to the egalitarian distribution would be zero (otherwise for some
problems an agent would receive an amount larger than her claim). So, we
propose that the weight of each of the two distributions depends on each
claims problem. In so doing, we define the weight used on the egalitarian
distribution to be the highest weight such that resulting vector satisfies the
claims boundedness restriction.
On the other hand, we may differentiate between two different kinds of
problems: the first kind are problems where the per-capita estate is small
relative to the smallest claim, c1 ≥ E (a condition called in the literature
as an unsustainable claim), and the second where the smallest claim is sus-
tainable. Then, if the claims problem is in the first category, the egalitarian
distribution satisfies claims boundedness and all agents receive equal awards;
if the claims problem falls in the second category, we first assign to each
agent the smallest claim (egalitarian distribution), revise claims and estate
accordingly, and then distribute the remaining estate proportionally to the
revised claims (proportional solution). By this way, we define a new solution.
Our main result, Proposition 3, shows that both approaches coincide in the
same solution which we call αmin−Egalitarian solution.7
In short, our compromise solution:
• modifies the Equal Awards division, so that the proposal satisfies the
claim-boundedness condition and it is a bankruptcy solution;
• modifies the Proportional solution and considers a minimal amount
7An interesting question that has been addressed to us is if we can do the same for any
bankruptcy solution ψ instead of the Proportional one. We will see that it is not possible,
in general, to extend our results.
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that each agent should receive.8 This minimal amount is endogenously
determined in each particular problem (E, c);
• the result it provides is the same that we will obtain if we assign to
each agent this minimal amount, and distribute the remaining (if there
exist) in a proportional way.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the preliminaries.
Section 3 presents our solution concept. Sections 4 and 5 contain the ax-
iomatic analysis. Finally, Section 6 contains some comments. The Appendix
gathers the proofs.
2. Preliminaries: claims problems.
Throughout the paper we will consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
Each agent is identified by her claim, ci, i ∈ N , on the estate E. A claims
problem appears whenever the estate is not enough to satisfy all the claims;
that is,
n∑
i=1
ci > E. Without loss of generality, we will order the agents ac-
cording to their claims: c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ··· ≤ cn. The pair (E, c) represents the
claims problem, and we will denote by B the set of all claims problems.
A claims solution (solution) is a single valued function ϕ : B → Rn+ such
that, 0 ≤ ϕi(E, c) ≤ ci,∀i ∈ N (non-negativity and claim-boundedness), and
n∑
i=1
ϕi(E, c) = E (efficiency).
Many solution concepts have been defined in the literature about
claims problems (see for instance Thomson (2003), and Bosmans and Lauw-
ers (2011)). The two most important criteria are the Proportional and the
Egalitarian ones.
Definition 1. The Proportional solution, P . For each (E, c) ∈ B and
each i ∈ N , Pi(E, c) = λci, where λ = E∑
i∈N
ci
.
8Our proposal satisfies a lower bound on awards property; see Section 4.
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Definition 2. The Equal Awards division, EA. For each (E, c) ∈ B and
each i ∈ N , EAi(E, c) = En .
It is easy to find examples in which the equal distribution of the estate
exceeds some agent’s claim.9 So that, the EA division is not a solution, in
the sense we have defined it (EA may not satisfy the second part of the first
condition of a solution: claim-boundedness). In order to solve this situation
the following modification of the EA division has been introduced.
Definition 3. The Constrained Equal Awards solution, CEA. For each
(E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N , CEAi(E, c) ≡ min {ci, µ} , where µ is chosen so
that
∑
i∈N
min {ci, µ} = E.
3. A proposal of solution: αmin-Egalitarian
Given the Proportional and the Egalitarian divisions, we consider now
the family of compromises:
ϕα = αP + (1− α)EA α ∈ [0, 1] .
That is, given a claims problem (E, c) involving n agents,
(ϕα)i(E, c) = α
ciE∑n
i=1 ci
+ (1− α) E
n
α ∈ [0, 1] .
The following example computes this proposal for several values of α.
Example 1. Consider (E, c) = (100, (40, 50, 70)).
Claims α = 0 α = 0.25 α = 0.50 α = 0.75 α = 1
40 100/3 31.25 29.17 27.08 25
50 100/3 32.81 32.29 31.77 31.25
70 100/3 35.94 38.54 41.15 43.75
9For instance, consider the claims vector c = (20, 50, 60) and the estate E = 100.
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As we have already mentioned, when α = 0 the equal division may not
satisfy the conditions of a solution (claim boundedness fails). In order to
avoid this problem, we can obtain for every problem (E, c) the minimum
value of α ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕα is a solution:
α∗(E, c) = min {α ∈ [0, 1] such that (ϕα(E, c))i ≤ ci ∀i } .
Remark 1. Note that if we solve, for each agent i, the equation
αi : (ϕα(E, c))i = ci,
then
α∗(E, c) = max {α1, α2, . . . , αn}
Definition 4. The αmin−Egalitarian solution is defined for every claims
problem (E, c), with ci > 0 ∀i ∈ N , as:
ϕmin(E, c) = ϕα∗(E, c)
where α∗ = α∗(E, c)
Note that α∗ varies from a claims problem to another. However, by the
way it is defined, the αmin−Egalitarian solution is continuous. Next, we
consider a consistent extension of our solution in the presence of null claims,
and we analyze the way of obtaining α∗(E, c).
Definition 5. If there are some zero claims, c1 = c2 = . . . = ck = 0, cj > 0,
for all j > k, we extend our solution in a consistent way:
ϕmin(E, c) = (0, ϕmin(E, c¯)) 0 = (0, . . . , 0)1×k c¯ = (ck+1, . . . , cn)
Proposition 1. If the claim boundedness is fulfilled by the agent with lowest
claim, it is fulfilled by any agent:
(ϕα(E, c))1 ≤ c1 ⇒ (ϕα(E, c))i ≤ ci ∀i.
See the proof in the Appendix.
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Remark 2. The result in the above proposition does not remain true if we
use, in order to define ϕα, a solution ψ different from the Proportional one
ϕα = αψ + (1− α)EA α ∈ [0, 1].
For instance, if we consider the problem (E, c) = (90, (10, 12, 100)) and a
solution ψ such that ψ(90, (10, 12, 100)) = (8, 11, 71), then the second agent
is the one who defines α∗(E, c) = 18
19
. See Section 6.
In the following result we show the exact expression of α∗.
Proposition 2. Given a claims problem (E, c) the scalar α∗ is:
α∗(E, c) = max
{
0,
C (E − nc1)
E (C − nc1)
}
C =
n∑
i=1
ci
See the proof in the Appendix.
Remark 3. From this expression, it is immediate to see that, for E ≤ nc1,
α∗(E, c) = 0 and, for E ≥ nc1, α∗(E, c) is an strictly increasing and concave
function of E for fixed claims vector c, as shown in Figure 1.
Now, trying to facilitate the comparison with the main solutions in the
literature, we compute our proposal for the next two examples taken from
Bosmans and Lauwers (2011).10
Example 2. (E, c) = (1500, (500, 2000, 3500)).
ci CEA,ϕmin Pin, T, CE A RA,MO P CEL
500 500 250 214 166.7 125 0
2000 500 625 643 666.7 500 0
3500 500 625 643 666.7 875 1500
with α∗(E, c) = 0.
10Hereinafter, Pin, T, CE,A,RA,MO, and CEL will denote the Piniles’, Talmud, Con-
strained Egalitarian, Adjusted Proportional, Random Arrival, Minimal Overlap and Con-
strained Equal Losses solutions, respectively. See Thomson (2003) for their formal defini-
tions.
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Figure 1: α∗(E, c) as a function of E for fixed claims (c = (500, 2000, 3500)).
Example 3. (E, c) = (4500, (500, 2000, 3500)).
ci CEA,CE Pin ϕmin P RA A T MO CEL
500 500 500 500 375 333.3 285.72 250 166.7 0
2000 2000 1625 1500 1500 1333.3 1357.14 1375 1416.7 1500
3500 2000 2375 2500 2625 2333.3 2857.14 2875 2916.7 3000
with α∗(E, c) = 8
9
.
Finally, in the following result, we find a precise expression of our solution
which gives us an interesting interpretation: this solution assigns the minimal
claim to any agent; thus it distributes the remaining estate E ′ = E − nc1 in
a proportional way among the agents with respect to the remaining claims
c′i = ci − c1. The proof is given in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3. For each (E, c) ∈ B, with ci > 0, for all i,
ϕmin(E, c) =
 (E/n)1 c1 ≥ E/nc1 + P (E − nc1, c− c1) otherwise
where c1 =
 c1...
c1

n×1
and 1 =
 1...
1

n×1
The condition that splits both cases in Proposition 3 is known in the
literature with the name of sustainable claim.11 Note that if the smaller claim
c1 is not sustainable, c1 > E/n, then no claim is sustainable. Therefore, the
result in Proposition 3 can be stated as:
• If c1 is sustainable, then ϕmin(E, c) = c1 + P (E − nc1, c− c1).
• If c1 is not sustainable, then ϕmin(E, c) = EA(E, c).
In Figure 2 we represent the distribution of the estate, by depending on E,
given by the αmin−Egalitarian solution.
Remark 4. It is important to mention that, as in Remark 2, the result in
Proposition 3 is not true if we use a solution ψ different from the Proportional
one. See Section 6.
11A claim ci is said to be sustainable in (E, c), (see Herrero and Villar (2002)) if∑n
j=1 min {ci, cj} ≤ E
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Figure 2: The αmin−Egalitarian solution. The horizontal axis represents different levels
of the estate E, and vertical axis denotes the amount each agent receives according their
claims, c = (500, 2000, 3500). The solid black line represents the egalitarian distribution
of the estate our proposal obtains when E ≤ 1500. From this point on, our proposal
recommends the pointed-dashed lines for agents 1, 2, 3, from bottom to top, respectively.
4. Axiomatic analysis and comparison with other solutions.
In this section we analyze our solution from an axiomatic point of view.
First, next table summarizes the axiomatic comparative between the αmin−
Egalitarian solution and the ones more directly related to it, CEA and P .
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ϕmin P CEA
Order preservation Yes Yes Yes
Resource monotonicity Yes Yes Yes
Super-modularity Yes Yes Yes
Order preservation under claims variations Yes Yes Yes
Composition up Yes Yes Yes
Composition down Yes Yes Yes
Invariance under claims truncation No No Yes
Self-duality No Yes No
Midpoint property No Yes No
Limited consistency Yes Yes Yes
Reasonable lower bounds on awards Yes No Yes
In order to check that the αmin−Egalitarian solution satisfies, or not,
these properties, we formally give their definitions.
Order preservation (Aumann and Maschler (1985)) requires respecting
the ordering of the claims: if agent i′s claim is at least as large as agent
j′s claim, she should receive and lose at least as much as agent j does,
respectively.
Order preservation: for each (E, c) ∈ B, and each i, j ∈ N ,
such that ci ≥ cj, then ϕi(E, c) ≥ ϕj(E, c), and ci − ϕi(E, c) ≥
cj − ϕj(E, c).
Resource monotonicity (Curiel et al. (1987), Young (1987)) demands that
if the endowment increases, then all individuals should get at least what they
received initially.
Resource monotonicity: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each E ′ ∈ R+
such that C > E ′ > E, then ϕi(E ′, c) ≥ ϕi(E, c), for each i ∈ N.
Super-modularity (Dagan et al. (1997)) requires that if the amount to
divide increases, given two individuals, the one with the greater claim expe-
riences a larger gain than the other.
Super-modularity: for each (E, c) ∈ B, all E ′ ∈ R+ and each
i, j ∈ N such that C > E ′ > E and ci ≥ cj, then ϕi(E ′, c) −
ϕi(E, c) ≥ ϕj(E ′, c)− ϕj(E, c).
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Reasonable lower bounds on awards (Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004);
Dominguez and Thomson (2006)) ensures that each individual receives at
least the minimum of (i) her claim divided by the number of individuals, and
(ii) the amount available divided by the number of individuals.
Reasonable lower bounds on awards: for each (E, c) ∈ B
and each i ∈ N , ϕi(E, c) ≥ min{ci,E}n .
Order preservation under claims variations (Thomson (2006)) requires
that if the claim of some individual decreases, given two other individuals,
the one with the greater claim experiences a larger gain than the other.
Order preservation under claims variations: for each k ∈
N , each pair (E, c) and (E, c′) ∈ B, with c′ = (c′k, c−k) and c′k < ck
and each pair i and j ∈ N \ k with ci ≤ cj, ϕi(E, c′)−ϕi(E, c) ≤
ϕj(E, c
′)− ϕj(E, c).12
Composition down requires that if, after the resources are distributed,
they are reduced, a solution recommends the same allocation if we (i) cancel
the initial distribution and apply the solution in the new situation, or (ii)
consider the initial awards as agents’ claims on the revised problem and apply
the solution to this new problem.
Composition down: for each (E, c) ∈ B, each i ∈ N , and each
0 ≤ E ′ ≤ E, ϕi(E ′, c) = ϕi(E ′, ϕ(E, c)).
Composition up shows the opposite situation to composition down. If,
after the resources are distributed, they are increased, a solution recommends
the same allocation if we (i) cancel the initial distribution and apply the
solution in the new situation, or (ii) let agents keep their initial awards,
adjust claims down by these amounts, and reapply the solution to divide
only the increment of the estate with these adjusted claims.
Composition up: for each (E ′, c) ∈ B, each i ∈ N , and each
0 ≤ E ≤ E ′, ϕi(E ′, c) = ϕi(E, c) + ϕi(E ′ − E, c− ϕ(E, c)).
12We write (c′k, c−k) for the claims vector obtained from c by replacing ck by c
′
k.
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Limited consistency states that adding an agent with a zero claim does
not change the awards of the individuals already present. Obviously, if
(E, (c1, c2, ..., cn)) is a claims problem involving n individuals, then
(E, (0, c1, c2, ..., cn)) is a problem with n+ 1 individuals.
Limited consistency: for each (E, c) ∈ B, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n
ϕi(E, c) = ϕi(E, (0, c1, ..., cn)).
Next Proposition, whose proof is given in the Appendix, shows that the
αmin−Egalitarian solution fulfills the above mentioned properties.
Proposition 4. The αmin−Egalitarian solution fulfills Order preservation,
Resource monotonicity, Super-modularity, Reasonable lower bounds on awards,
Order preservation under claims variations, Composition up, Composition
down and Limited consistency.
Remark 5. Note that there is a property our solution fulfills that is not
satisfied by the Proportional solution: Reasonable lower bounds on awards.
This is the part that the EA division brings to our solution. The drawback
is that some properties P fulfills are lost. Next we show some of them.13
Self-Duality implies that a solution recommends the same allocation when
dividing awards and losses. Given a claims problem (E, c), losses are defined
by the difference among the estate and the claims, L =
∑
i∈N ci − E.
Self-duality: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N , ϕi(E, c) =
ci − ϕi(L, c).
Midpoint Property ensures to each agent half of her claim when the estate
equals half of the aggregate claim.
Midpoint Property: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N, if
E = C/2, then ϕi(E, c) = ci/2.
13It must be noticed that the main reason for not satisfying these properties is that EA,
taken as a function, does not satisfy them.
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Invariance under claims truncation tells us that the part of a claim that
is above the resources should not be taken into account.
Invariance under claims truncation: for each (E, c) ∈ B and
each i ∈ N , ϕi(E, c) = ϕi((E,min {ci, E}i∈N).
The following example shows that the αmin−Egalitarian solution does not
satisfy these properties.
Example 4. Consider (E, c) = (2000, (500, 2000, 3500)). Then
ϕmin(E, c) = (500, 666.66, 833.33).
(L, c) = (4000, (500, 2000, 3500)), and ϕmin(L, c) = (500, 1333.33, 2166.66).
So, c − ϕmin(L, c) = (0, 727.28, 1272.73) 6= ϕmin(E, c), not satisfying Self-
duality.
Midpoint property implies ϕ(E, c) = (250, 1000, 1750) 6= ϕmin(E, c).
For (E, c′) = (2000, (500, 2000, 2000)), αmin(E, c′) = (500, 750, 750) 6=
ϕmin(E, c), not satisfying Invariance under claims truncation.
Finally, we introduce an operation for solutions that will help us to an-
alyze the iterative application of the αmin−Egalitarian solution. We name
this operation Self-composition, since it is related to the Self-consistency
property (see for instance Grahn and Voorneveld (2002)).14 In particular,
Self-composition proposes a “recursive” distribution of the resources starting
from agent 1. Formally,
Definition 6. Self-composition: for each (E, c) ∈ B, and each m, 1 ≤
m ≤ n, the Self-composition of degree m is defined by:
ϕm(E, c) =
(
ϕ1(E
1, c1), . . . , ϕm−1(Em−1, cm−1), ϕm(Em, cm), . . . , ϕn(Em, cm)
)
,
where (E1, c1) = (E, c) and for all k > 1,
Ek = Ek−1 − ϕk−1(Ek−1, ck−1); ck = (0, . . . , 0, ck, . . . , cn).
14Self-consistency: for each (E, c) ∈ B, each S ⊆ N and each i ∈ S, then ϕi(E, c) =
ϕi
( ∑
k∈S
ϕk(E, c), c|S
)
.
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For instance, the Self-composition of degree 2 for some solution, ϕ2, is ob-
tained in the following way: first, agent 1 receives the amount recommended
for her by ϕ(E, c); then we solve the new problem in which the estate is re-
duced in the amount given to agent 1, and this agent has no claim anymore.
That is, ϕ2(E, c) =
(
ϕ1(E, c), ϕ2
(
E2, c2
)
, ϕ3
(
E2, c2
)
, . . . , ϕn
(
E2, c2
))
where
E2 = E − ϕ1(E, c); c2 = (0, c2, . . . , cn).
It is immediate to observe that if a solution is Self-consistent, then the
Self-composition of any degree coincides with the own function (in some
sense, it is idempotent); i.e., if ϕ satisfies Self-consistency, then
∀(E, c) ∈ B, ∀m ϕm(E, c) = ϕ(E, c).
Next result, which can be straightforwardly obtained from Proposition
3, shows that if we compute the Self-composition of degree n − 1 of the
αmin−Egalitarian solution, we obtain the CEA solution.
Proposition 5. The Self-composition of degree n−1 of the αmin−Egalitarian
solution retrieves the CEA solution, where n is the number of agents.
The result in the above Proposition may be understood as a recursive
process (for a solution ϕ) which can be described as follows. Assume the
agents are ordered so that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. The solution ϕ applied to
the original problem (E, c) only determines the share of agent 1, who in turn
leaves with this share. The estate is reduced accordingly and the updated
problem, say (E2, c2) for agents 2, 3, . . . , n is now used only to determine the
share of agent 2. Agent 2 then leaves with this share and the estate is again
reduced to construct (E3, c3) for agents 3, 4, . . . , n. This recursive process
is used to determine the share of every agent. The result shows that this
recursive process, when applied to ϕmin, produces the CEA allocation.
The αmin−Egalitarian solution does not satisfy self-consistency (other-
wise, self-composition could not retrieve the CEA solution). But it satisfies
a weaker version that we call backwards consistency. This condition requires
that if the agent with largest claim leaves with his part, none of the other
agents takes advantage.
Definition 7. Backwards Consistency: for each (E, c) ∈ B,
ϕ(E, c) =
(
ϕ
(
E − ϕn(E, c), (c1, c2, . . . , cn−1, 0)
)
, ϕn(E, c)
)
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It is obvious that Self-consistency implies Backwards-consistency, but the
converse is not true as shows the following result in which we prove that the
αmin−Egalitarian solution satisfies this property. The proof is given in the
Appendix.
Proposition 6. The αmin−Egalitarian solution satisfies Backwards-consis-
tency.
5. Lorenz dominance.
An interesting tool to compare the behavior of solution concepts is that
of Lorenz dominance. Let Rn+ be the set of positive n-dimensional vectors
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ordered from small to large, i.e., 0 < x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn.
Let x and y be in Rn+. We say that x Lorenz dominates y, x L y, if
for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1: x1 + x2 + · · · + xk ≥ y1 + y2 + . . . + yk and
x1 + x2 + . . . + xn = y1 + y2 + . . . + yn. If x Lorenz dominates y and x 6= y,
then at least one of these n−1 inequalities is a strict inequality. The following
definition extends the notion of Lorenz dominance to bankruptcy solutions.
Definition 8. Given two solutions ϕ and ψ it is said that ϕ Lorenz domi-
nates ψ, ϕ L ψ, if for any claims problem (E, c) the vector ϕ(E, c) Lorenz
dominates ψ(E, c).
Lorenz domination is a criterion used to check whether a solution is more
favorable to smaller claimants relative to larger claimants. So, in some sense,
a Lorenz dominant solution can be understood as more equitable. In a recent
paper, Bosmans and Lauwers (2011) obtain a Lorenz dominance comparison
among several solutions and they obtain that CEA is the more equitable
solution, in the sense that it Lorenz dominates any other solution. More
precisely, the dominance relation they obtain is as follows:
CEA L CE L Pin L P L CEL
Then, the Proportional solution only dominates CEL, which is the most
favorable solution for larger claimants relative to smaller ones (so, the less
equitable one).15
15See Bosmans and Lauwers (2011) for additional relationships.
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Among the solutions analyzed in Bosmans and Lauwers (2011), only CEA
dominates the αmin−Egalitarian solution. Next result shows the Lorenz re-
lationships between our solution and the ones on that paper.
Proposition 7.
a) The αmin−Egalitarian solution Lorenz dominates P and CEL.
b) There is no Lorenz domination between the αmin−Egalitarian solution and
CE, Pin, RA, MO, T , and A solutions.
Part b), with respect to CE and Pin is directly obtained from exam-
ples 2 and 3. Moreover, example 3 shows a claims problem in which the
αmin−Egalitarian solution Lorenz dominates RA,MO, T and A. Next ex-
ample shows a case in which these solutions are not Lorenz dominated by
the αmin−Egalitarian solution.
Example 5. Let (E, c) = (20, (2, 20, 40)) . Then,
ci ϕmin RA = MO A T
2 2 0.66 0.96 1.9
20 6.5 9.66 9.52 9.5
40 11.5 9.66 9.52 9.5
Proof of part a) is given in the Appendix.
6. Final comments.
In this paper we have proposed a compromise between the two most
important and well-known ways of solving distribution problems: the Pro-
portional and the Egalitarian. Moreover, we have analyzed the properties
of this new solution and defined a recursive process, Self-composition, which
allows us to recover the Constrained Equal Awards solution, by using our
solution.
A natural question arises at this point: if we consider an alternative
solution concept (e.g. Talmud solution, T ) and we define in an analogous
way
ϕTα = αT + (1− α)EA α ∈ [0, 1],
can we obtain with ϕTmin all the results we have obtained with ϕmin? The
answer is negative, as we have yet mentioned. The main result, that shows
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the equivalence between finding the α∗ and applying ϕmin, or assigning to
each agent the smallest claim and distribute the remaining estate by using
the Talmud solution, is no longer true, as the following example shows:16
Example 6. Consider (E, c) = (4500, (500, 2000, 3500)) . Then, T (E, c) =
(250, 1375, 2875), EA(E, c) = (1500, 1500, 1500), α∗ = 0.8, and we obtain:
ϕTmin = (500, 1400, 1600) But, if we compute (500, 500, 500)+
T (3000, (0, 1500, 3000)) = (500, 500, 500)+(0, 750, 2250) = (500, 1250, 2750),
which is a different result.
Note that the αmin−Egalitarian solution can be also understood as a
kind of “Constrained Proportional” solution in the sense that it can be used
to ensure a minimum amount to any agent. Suppose that a small amount
c˜ < c1 must be received by each agent.
17 What remains of the estate, if any, is
shared proportionally among all agents. Then, given a claims problem (E, c)
this distribution can be obtained by using the αmin-Egalitarian solution in
the following way:
ϕ(E, c) := ϕmin(E + c˜, c
∗) c∗ = (c0 = c˜, c1, . . . , cn)
where only the last n−components of the αmin−Egalitarian solution are con-
sidered. This interpretation can be used, as we have mentioned in the In-
troduction, to obtain the distribution of seats in Spanish Parliament among
districts. The Spanish system guarantees two seats to any district. The
other seats are distributed to districts proportional to the population. Then,
by applying the αmin-Egalitarian solution with c˜ = 2 we obtain the actual
distribution of seats.
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Appendix
A1: Proof of Proposition 1
For each (E, c) ∈ B and given an agent i 6= 1 ∈ N , (ϕmin(E, c))i =
(1−α∗)E
n
+α∗
ciE
C
= = c1−α∗ c1E
C
+α∗
ciE
C
= = ci+
(
α∗E
C
− 1
)
(ci − c1) ≤ ci

A2: Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1, α∗ is the solution of the equation:
αP1 + (1− α)E
n
= c1,
that implies
α =
E
n
− c1
( 1
n
− c1
C
)E
=
C (E − nc1)
E (C − nc1) C =
n∑
i=1
ci.
By observing that denominator is always positive, it is immediate to
obtain that this fraction is less or equal than 1. On the other hand, it is
negative whenever
E
n
≤ c1 and, in this case, α∗ = 0.

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A3: Proof of Proposition 3
Given a claims problem (E, c) ∈ B, it is clear that whenever c1 ≥ E/n
then α∗(E, c) = 0 and ϕmin(E, c) = CEA(E, c) = E/n.
Suppose now that c1 < E/n. Then, for each i ∈ N , see Proposition 2,
(ϕmin(E, c))i = α
∗Pi(E, c) + (1− α∗)EAi(E, c) =
=
C (E − nc1)
E (C − nc1)
Eci∑n
j=1 cj
+
(
1− C (E − nc1)
E (C − nc1)
)
E
n
=
=
E − nc1
C − nc1 ci +
c1 (C − E)
C − nc1 =
= c1 + (E − nc1) ci − c1
C − nc1 = c1 + Pi
(
E − nc1, c− c1
)
.

A4: Proof of Proposition 4
In order to check this result, note that for each (E, c) ∈ B, if c1 ≥ En ,
then the ϕmin distributes the estate as the EA solution, which satisfies all
properties. Otherwise,
ϕmin(E, c) = c
1 + P (E − nc1, c− c1).
That is, each agent receives the smallest claim c1 and the remaining estate
E1 = E − nc1 is distributed in a proportional way among the other agents.
Then, Order Preservation is obvious. With respect to Resource monotonicity
the only unclear case is whenever
c1 <
E ′
n
and c1 ≥ E
n
.
Then,
ϕmin(E, c) =
E
n
, ϕmin(E
′, c) = c1 + P
(
E ′1, c− c1
)
.
and the property is fulfilled. A similar reasoning can be made with Super-
modularity and Composition down. Regarding to Composition up the only
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unclear case is whenever c1 >
E′
n
and c1 ≤ En . But, in this case, ϕmin(E ′, c) =
ϕmin(E
′, ϕmin(E, c)) = En , and the property is fulfilled.
Reasonable lower bounds on awards is satisfied, since
(ϕmin(E, c))i ≥ min
{
E
n
, c1 + Pi
(
E1, c− c1
)} ≥ min {ci, E}
n
.
Finally, in order to prove that our solution fulfills Order preservation under
claims variations consider two claims problems (E, c), (E, c′) ∈ B, such that
c′ = (c′k, c−k), c
′
k < ck, and consider i, j ∈ N \ k with ci ≤ cj. We have the
following possibilities:
(1.) If c1 ≥ c′1 ≥ En , then the αmin distributes the estate as the CEA solution,
which satisfies Order preservation under claims truncation.
(2.) If c1 ≥ En > c′1, then k = 1 and
(ϕmin)i(E, c) =
E
n
(ϕmin)i(E, c
′) = c′1 +
E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c′1)
(ci − c′1).
So, for each pair i, j ∈ N \ 1 with ci ≤ cj,
[(ϕmin)i(E, c
′)− (ϕmin)i(E, c) ≤ (ϕmin)j(E, c′)− (ϕmin)j(E, c)]⇔
⇔
c′1 + E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c′1)
(ci − c′1)−
E
n
≤ c′1 +
E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c′1)
(cj − c′1)−
E
n
⇔
⇔ [ci − c′1 ≤ cj − c′1]⇔ ci ≤ cj.
(3.) If c1 ≤ En , then
(ϕmin)i(E, c) = c1 +
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c1)(ci − c1)
(3.1.) If k = 1, for each pair i, j ∈ N \ 1 with ci ≤ cj,
[(ϕmin)i(E, c
′)− (ϕmin)i(E, c) ≤ (ϕmin)j(E, c′)− (ϕmin)j(E, c)]⇔
⇔
c′1 + E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c′1)
(ci − c′1)− c1 −
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c1)(ci − c1) ≤
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≤ c′1 +
E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c′1)
(cj − c′1)− c1 −
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c1)(cj − c1)
⇔
⇔
 E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c′1)
(ci − c′1)−
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c1)(ci − c1) ≤
E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c′1)
(cj − c′1)−
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c1)(cj − c1)
⇔
⇔
 E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c1)(cj − ci) ≤
E − nc′1∑
i∈N\1
(cj − c′1)
(cj − ci)
⇔ c′1 ≤ c1.
(3.2.) If k 6= 1, then
(ϕmin)i(E, c) = c1 +
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c1)(ci − c1)
(ϕmin)j(E, c) = c1 +
E − nc1∑
i∈N\1
(ci − c1)(cj − c1),
and the property is fulfilled.
Clearly, by the way we have defined our consistent extension (see Remark
4), the αmin−Egalitarian solution fulfills Limited consistency.
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A5: Proof of Proposition 6
Consider a claims problem (E, c) ∈ B.
(1.) If c1 ≤ E
n
, and we name (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = ϕmin(E, c)
xi = c1 +
ci − c1
C − c1 (E − nc1); C =
n∑
i=1
ci;
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E ′ = E − xn = (n− 1)c1 + (E − nc1)− cn − c1
C − nc1 (E − nc1);
c′ = (c1, c2, . . . , cn − 1); C ′ = C − cn; c1 ≤ E
′
n− 1 .
Then,
(ϕmin)i(E
′, c′) = c1 +
ci − c1
C ′ − c1 (E
′ − (n− 1)c1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
which coincides with xi.
(2.) If c1 >
E
n
, then ϕmin(E, c) = EA(E, c) =
E
n
and the property is
fulfilled.

A6: Proof of Proposition 7
a) For each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N , it follows from Bosmans and
Lauwers (2011) that ϕmin Lorenz dominates CEL. In order to prove that it
also dominates the proportional solution P , some notation will help. Given
a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) we define the partial sums vector:
zx = (x1, x1 + x2, . . . , x1 + x2 + ...+ xn)
Then, x L y ⇔ x 6= y and (zx)i ≥ (zy)i. Now denote:
x = EA(E, c) y = P (E, c)
We know that x L y, so (zx)i ≥ (zy)i. For each α ∈ [0, 1],
α (zy)i + (1− α) (zx)i ≥ α (zy)i + (1− α) (zy)i = (zy)i .
We conclude that
(
zϕmin(E, c)
)
i
≥ (zy)i and then ϕmin(E, c) L P (E, c).

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